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THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
CONTEXT FOR THE CHANGES IN 
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION 
Robert Stephens* 
The changes in ACC after 1980 cannot be separated from profound changes in the shape and 
direction of New Zealand's political economy.  Responding initially to the inherited economic 
imbalances in the 1970s, after 1984 the governing Labour Party launched a major restructuring of 
the economy and state administration.  This paper describes the theories and objectives behind that 
transformation, as well as the generally disappointing results for economic performance and social 
equity.  Further erosion of confidence in the state and dedication to market-driven policies 
continued well into the 1990s under the National Party.  This paper documents the major trends 
during this entire period for employment, productivity, social inequality, and poverty. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Ever since its inception in 1973, the Accident Compensation Commission (ACC) has been both 
an administrative orphan, through its establishment as a quango rather than department of State,1 
and a social outlier, based on social insurance principles rather than the tax-financed, flat-rate 
benefits of the existing social security system.2 However, the subsequent changes to ACC are 
integrally related to the wider political context that drove the economic and social changes faced by 
New Zealand during the last two decades of the twentieth century.  
During the 1980s, the successive Ministers of Finance, Robert D Muldoon (National) and Roger 
Douglas (Labour) had polar views on the objectives of policy, the appropriate economic theory, the 
role of markets, and the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy in maintaining economic 
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stability. The 1980s transformed the economic landscape, moving the economy from a heavily 
regulated and protected environment to an open economy with market forces determining resource 
allocation.3 The 1990s witnessed an equally dramatic overhaul of the welfare state, moving from 
predominantly state funding and universal or categorical provision to a residualist and targeted 
welfare state with increased private funding and provision.4  
While the majority of the papers in this volume trace the development of ACC, this article sets 
the economic and social scene and context for those changes. The reforms to ACC relate more to the 
underlying economic theories and views on human motivation of the reform era than to the 
intellectual origins of ACC. The ACC changes relate to attempts to reduce the level and scope of 
government by greater use of resource allocation via market mechanisms coupled with 
developments in the machinery of government and income maintenance arenas rather than the 
principles of social insurance. The economic theory and changing views on human motivation that 
underpinned the reforms represent the starting point for this article. The contrast between the two 
halves of the 1980s is made before some of the reform details are considered, while presenting some 
of the less than impressive economic and social outcomes from that period.5 
II DIRECTIONS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE 
A The End of the Golden Weather 
The immediate post-war period saw New Zealand enjoy a comparatively high standard of living, 
with increasing demand for agricultural production through preferential access to the United 
Kingdom market. Unemployment remained low through this period, assisted by a system of import 
licences and tariffs that enabled an embryonic manufacturing sector to develop, using international 
capital to finance investment in plant and machinery. Figure 1 shows the continuous prosperity 
through the 1960s, with high rates of economic growth, modest inflation and a very low level of 
unemployment. Figure 2 shows relatively small deficits on both the balance of payments on current 
account and the government budget. These deficits were used beneficially as they permitted capital 
inflow for net new investment to foster further economic growth.  
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4  Robert Stephens "Social Service" in Brian Silverstone, Alan Bollard and Ralph Lattimore (eds) A Study of 
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"New Zealand" in John Williamson (ed) The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Institute for International 
Economics, Washington DC, 1994) 1; Brian Easton The Commercialisation of New Zealand (Auckland 
University Press, Auckland, 1997); Lewis Evans, Arthur Grimes, Bryce Wilkinson and David Teece 
"Economic Reform in New Zealand 1984-95: The Pursuit of Efficiency" (1996) 34 Journal of Economic 
Literature 1856; Silverstone, Bollard and Lattimore, above. 
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As a consequence, during the 1960s New Zealand could afford a modest social security system 
and universal health care and education at minimal fiscal cost, and declining aggregate government 
expenditure (Figure 3). The social security system provided a flat-rate benefit as of right to those in 
contingent groups likely to be at risk of hardship. The reciprocal obligation to seek work was 
accepted by the majority of beneficiaries. As a consequence, people were on benefits due to factors 
beyond their control – poor health, old age or lack of effective macroeconomic demand. 
These three Figures also demonstrate that New Zealand fared worse than most of its 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) compatriots during the 1970s. 
The combined impact of oil-price shocks, the initial impact of global restructuring, United Kingdom 
entry into the European Community plus the distortionary impact of the European Community's 
Common Agricultural Policy resulted in stagflation – low economic growth and rising inflation. 
However, internal policies within New Zealand exacerbated the impact. Import protection had 
resulted in a high exchange rate, and when combined with the resulting increased costs for farmers 
and exports of manufactured products, led to the introduction of Supplementary Minimum Prices for 
many agricultural products and export incentives for manufacturers. This attempt to offset the home 
market bias from import protection led to further price distortions within the New Zealand economy, 
and greater government expenditure.  
Attempts to cure a significant balance of payments deficit by curbing internal demand resulted 
in low growth and increasing unemployment from the mid-1970s. Both the balance of payments 
deficit and the budget deficit allowed New Zealanders to live beyond their means (or consume more 
than they were able to produce). The result was increasing internal and external debt, and the 
interest on that debt fuelled growth in government spending, crowding out other government 
expenditures.  
Thus New Zealand entered the 1980s with a seriously distorted economy, with low economic 
growth, high inflation and increasing fiscal pressures. The New Zealand Planning Council had 
argued "the fact that government revenue requirements have increased at a time when real take 
home pay was falling has made New Zealanders more conscious of the cost of public policy".6 The 
Planning Council accepted that economic growth would be less than 3 per cent per annum, and then 
argued that government expenditure needed to be contained to less than the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth rate, with the major recommendation being a reduction in the cost of National 
Superannuation.7 
  
6  New Zealand Planning Council The Welfare State? Social Policy in the 1980s (New Zealand Planning 
Council, Wellington, 1979). 
7  On ACC the Planning Council recommended that the Sickness and Invalids Benefits should be integrated 
with ACC, with a short-term earnings-related benefit for both groups and in the long-term a flat-rate social 
assistance benefit. Rehabilitation was to be uniform across both groups.  
  
354 (2003) 34 VUWLR 
As Table 1 indicates, the policy responses taken by successive governments could not have 
diverged more, and were totally contrary to the traditional philosophical premises of their political 
parties. As Prime Minister and Minister of Finance for the conservative, right-wing National 
Government between 1975 and 1984, Robert D Muldoon became increasingly interventionist, 
regulating markets, trade and investment decisions, and controlling inflation through a wage-price 
freeze. After a snap election in 1984, with no agreed detailed manifesto to pursue, the three Finance 
Ministers (Roger Douglas, Richard Prebble and David Caygill) of the traditionally left-leaning 
Labour Government used a post-election constitutional crisis emanating from a run on foreign 
exchange to implement a range of market-based policies with seemingly limited concern for vertical 
equity.  
TABLE 1: CONTRASTING POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND OBJECTIVES 
Policy Muldoon 1975-84 Lange/Douglas 1984-1990 
Markets Regulate, wage/price freeze 
for macro stability 
Deregulation, liberalisation 
for efficiency of markets 
Government business entities Ministerial control, political 
and social objectives 
Independence, commercial 
criteria, internal efficiency 
Exchange Rate Fixed, balance of payments 
deficit 
Devaluation, floating, but 
overshooting 
International trade Protection, control capital 
flows, offset home market 
bias  
Removal of tariffs, free capital 
flows, "the level playing field" 
Fiscal policy Keynesian expansion, deficit, 
growth GDP 
Overcome deficit by tax 
revenue, privatisation 
Monetary policy Conflict with fiscal, controls 
on interest rates, lending 
Dominant, interest rates to 
control inflation 
Tax  Reliance on income tax, high 
rates but loopholes 
Base broadening, lower top 
rates, shift to indirect tax 
Social policy Universal, generous pension, 
tax expenditures 
Incentives, targeting with fees, 
family assistance 
Agriculture Supplementary minimum 
prices, monopoly seller 
Free markets, producer board 
monopoly reduced 
Government organisation Large departments, mixed 
functions, input budgeting 
Separation into operations 
policy, funding, output control 
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B The Muldoon Era 
Faced with higher oil prices, slow growth, rising unemployment and increasing inflation, plus a 
distrust in the power of markets to reallocate resources in the face of global change, Muldoon was 
led to the development of the government-backed growth strategy projects (Think Big) revolving 
around intensive use of energy.  While some projects were designed to reduce the dependency upon 
oil, the impact of importing the necessary technology and equipment had a negative impact on the 
balance of payments. Treasury calculations showed that the projects were only profitable if the real 
price of oil continued to increase dramatically. However, the subsequent decline in the oil price 
resulted in the government having to meet contractual obligations to the companies involved, further 
exacerbating a budget deficit situation (Figure 2).8 
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, macroeconomic policy had been contradictory, with 
expansionary fiscal policy offset by tight monetary policy, combined with a three-year election 
cycle of boom and restraint. There was also a micro-economic aspect to this public choice 
perspective on policy, with policies such as the generous National Superannuation (paid from age 
60) and the growth strategy projects designed to capture votes of special interest groups or key 
electorates. The policy focus was one of strong regulation (though many of the regulations were 
never enforced), with price controls on many key products, strict criteria for business entry, quotas 
and licences for imports, direct control over the money supply by reserve requirements for the banks 
and extensive occupational licensing.  
This regulatory approach reaches its zenith in 1982 with the introduction of a comprehensive 
wage-price freeze on most prices, wages, salaries, directors' fees and interest rates. The reduction in 
consumer price inflation to 3.5 per cent in 19849 (Figure 1) showed that the policy was a partial 
success, but the reverberation in inflation in 1985 shows the arbitrary nature of that success. 
Moreover, economic growth only averaged 2.2 per cent per annum over this period.  
The freeze also came at the cost of a seriously distorted economy through developments such as 
fringe benefits as a significant part of some wage packets; the growth of fringe financial institutions 
to provide mortgage finance as the controls on bank mortgage lending rates led those institutions to 
withdraw their services; and differential cost increases impacted unevenly on firm profitability. 
Only international trade showed some signs of liberalisation, with seemingly reluctant moves to 
switch from import quotas to tariffs along with the development of a full free-trade agreement with 
Australia (Closer Economic Relations - CER). There was a significant rise in government 
expenditure, especially social security expenditure, due to the generous pension scheme (Figure 3) 
and the emergence of unemployment (Figure 1). Tax cuts in 1979 and 1982 offset the impact of 
  
8  Paul Dalziel and Ralph Lattimore The New Zealand Macroeconomy: A Briefing on the Reforms (3 ed, 
Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999). 
9  Inflation measured by the GDP deflator fell from 15.6 per cent in 1982 to 8.0 per cent in 1984. 
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fiscal drag on wage packets, but failed to reduce disincentive and tax avoidance effects of high 
marginal tax rates of up to 66 per cent, and did not attempt to address the significant budget deficit 
of up to 20 per cent of government expenditure or 6-8 per cent of GDP (Figure 2).  
C The 1984-1990 Era of Reform 
This period has to be initially seen as a reaction to the regulatory stance of the Muldoon era, and 
its poor economic outcomes, but quickly became a coherent policy direction when the objectives of 
reforming Ministers coincided with the economic theory and policy directions of the Treasury. 
While issues of economic efficiency always dominated the agenda, there are several caveats to that 
broad statement: first, during the period there was a change from allocative efficiency (ensuring that 
the nation is producing the right kinds of goods and services for its degree of comparative advantage 
and relative cost structure) to internal or managerial efficiency (maximising output within an 
organisation for its given inputs).  
Second, the issue of horizontal equity10 – treating equals equally or "the level playing field" – 
reinforced the allocative efficiency objectives. The view that government should be neutral in regard 
to resource allocation also meant that the income distribution and profit levels should be determined 
by market forces, modified by tax rates, rather than degree of government assistance, patronage or 
protection.  
Third, in the first blush of the reforms, vertical equity and social justice concerns were 
considered, even if later abandoned for the benefit principle or user-pays philosophy. For high 
income earners, the broadening of the base of the personal income tax system possibly more than 
offset the initial reduction in the top take rate from 66 per cent to 48 per cent; the targeted family 
support tax credit for low income workers increased real take-home pay at the lower end of the 
income distribution; an affluence-test for the generous universal pension scheme was introduced; 
and increased health and education expenditures appeared in the first two Labour Budgets.  
The economic theory underpinning the reforms has several inter-related strands, first presented 
in Treasury's (1984) Briefing to the Incoming Minister, Economic Management.11 The basic starting 
  
10  As Musgrave in Richard Musgrave "ET, OT and SBT" (1976) 6 Journal of Public Economics 3-16, has 
pointed out, without horizontal equity, any attempt at achieving vertical equity is a random lottery. While 
tax and other changes reduced the nominal degree of income redistribution, the actual change in the 
redistributive impact of government was possibly far less, as many of the tax and other privileges applied to 
a proportion of those on higher incomes.  
11  Both New Zealand Treasury Economic Management: Briefing to the Incoming Minister (Government 
Printer, Wellington, 1984) and Reserve Bank of New Zealand Post Election Paper to the Minister of 
Finance on the Areas of Responsibility of the Reserve Bank (RBNZ, Wellington, 1984) were critically 
reviewed by Zanetti and others in Giovanni Zanetti "Opening the Books: A Review Article" (1984) 18 New 
Zealand Economics Papers 13-30.  The implicit predictions of the reviewers, especially on the 
macroeconomic side, were probably closer to the actual outcome than those of the Treasury (and Reserve 
Bank). 
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block is the efficiency of markets hypothesis: that unfettered markets will speedily adjust to 
changing economic circumstances, ensuring full employment of resources as well as their efficient 
use. Distributional issues should not be directly addressed as that leads to disincentive effects. The 
economic growth resulting from market allocation will ensure a higher standard of living for all, 
with the trickle-down effect looking after the least well-off. 
At the macro-economic level, the main theoretical framework was based on mainstream new 
classical macroeconomics, including rational expectations and the rejection of any trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation. Supply-side economics, with increasing emphasis on the role of 
economic incentives, became influential, especially in relation to the tax and benefit systems. 
Monetary policy, operated via varying interest-rates through control over the money supply, 
targeted inflation as the sole objective of policy. This inflation target later became enshrined in the 
Reserve Bank Act 1989, creating an independent Reserve Bank with annual rate of inflation target 
of zero to 2 percent. Fiscal policy was relegated to ensuring budgetary balance over a business cycle 
combined with minimal levels of debt. The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 gave legislative status to 
this objective, and this Act now places an effective constraint on government in relation to changing 
the magnitude of future tax and expenditure decisions. 
The micro-economic theory was more radical. It combined developments in public choice, that 
saw the majority of government decisions as appeasing special interest groups for their political 
votes rather than to offset market failures; the economics of internal organisational behaviour, based 
on principal-agent theory, that demonstrated the incentive and monitoring problems within public 
sector organisations; and use of transaction cost and contestability theories that argued the need for 
only light-handed regulation to achieve efficient market-based outcomes via competition.12  
D The Reform Details 
As the list below indicates, the economic reforms were widespread, affecting virtually every 
sector of the economy, and were implemented quickly without regard to the interdependencies 
between the reforms. The major reforms included: 
• Devaluation of the exchange rate by 20 per cent in 1984, to overcome the persistent 
balance of payments deficit by encouraging growth in value-added export industries. The 
exchange rate was floated in 1985 to stop the constraint on economic growth from an over-
valued fixed exchange rate. 
• Lifting the wage-price freeze, in order to provide the correct price signals for 
manufacturers, consumers and retailers.  
  
12  Brian Silverstone, Alan Bollard and Ralph Lattimore (eds) A Study of Economic Reform: The Case of New 
Zealand (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1996). 
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• Removal of subsidies to business, and industrial deregulation. Arbitrary restrictions on 
entry and exit of firms and occupations were taken away. The objective was to achieve the 
neutrality of government in relation to private sector decisions and to ensure the benefits of 
competition through greater contestability of markets, which was especially important for 
the corporatisation/privatisation process. 
• Corporatisation and privatisation of government trading departments. The objective of 
corporatisation was to increase both allocative and managerial efficiency: by the removal 
of ministerial control over decision-making and the development of commercial or profit 
criteria; by relating prices to costs of production, downstream industries faced appropriate 
price signals; and freedom of new entry would control monopoly behaviour. Privatisation 
was designed to permit capital market pressures to increase productive efficiency as well as 
reduce the size of the public debt.13 
• Tax reform. The objectives were to increase government revenue, to make the tax system 
simpler, increase horizontal equity and reduce labour market disincentive effects. The top 
tax rate was cut from 66 per cent to 33 per cent, the tax base broadened, greater reliance 
was placed on indirect taxes through the introduction of a comprehensive, single-rate 
value-added tax, the Goods and Services Tax (GST) and greater tax assistance to low 
income families. 
• Reform of the monetary and financial system. Monetary policy altered from direct control 
over the money supply to inflation targeting, the financial sector was deregulated, with 
relaxation of controls on entry into the financial sector and on bank lending, as well as 
permitting international capital flows.  
• Removal of import protection. High and varied levels of effective rates of protection 
through import licenses were switched to tariff equivalents, with a timetable for reducing 
the average level of protection and making it more neutral between sectors – the level 
playing field - to improve allocative efficiency. 
• Reform of public administration, with public servants becoming explicit agents for their 
minister, and the separation of policy advice from implementation and funding from 
provision.  
• Under Labour, social policy reform was confused, resulting in the proliferation of Task 
Forces. However, there was a definite trend towards targeting rather than universality, 
greater use of household expenditures and private provision of services, resulting in the 
  
13  While the sale of assets can be used to retire public debt, and thus future interest on debt, there are two 
offsetting factors. First, future dividends and profits from these assets will disappear, reducing future 
government revenue. Second, during the late 1980s, as the government budget was still in deficit, 
effectively asset sales allowed the government to maintain expenditure levels rather than retire debt.  
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development of a user-pays philosophy, and a belief that the growth in beneficiary numbers 
was due to incorrect incentives in the benefit system.  
E Economic and Social Outcomes 
The outcomes of the reform process were disappointing. Figure 1 highlights the low or negative 
economic growth during the period and rising unemployment, though inflationary pressures were 
brought under control by the end of the decade.14 Both the balance of payments and budget deficits 
were reduced (Figure 2).15 At the macroeconomic level, the major problem was exchange rate 
overshooting, partly a consequence of incorrect sequencing of the reforms and partly through an 
overemphasis on the control of inflation.  
Raising interest-rates through control of the supply of money had two inter-related effects in a 
small, open economy with no controls on capital flows. First, there is the direct effect of higher 
interest-rates on the domestic economy, especially investment activity. Second, higher interest-rates 
(relative to the rest of the world) lead to capital inflows, and raise the exchange rate above its 
equilibrium trade level: the higher exchange rate both lowers the price of import and export goods 
and services within New Zealand (achieving the inflation target) and reduces cost-push inflation via 
the lower level of internal demand. The reduction in aggregate demand was exacerbated by the 
substantial resource reallocation flowing out from the previously protected industries and the 
improvements in internal efficiency from the corporatised industries. But the overvalued exchange 
rate meant that there were few new growth industries to absorb the released labour.  
After the 1987 stock market crash,16 the Labour Government was heavily divided on the 
direction of social and tax policy. One group wanted to apply the economic theory to social policy 
and substantially reduce the role of the state in education and health, with user pays, incentive 
effects and targeting. Another group wanted traditional social justice concerns to dominate. This 
split in Labour ensured its defeat in the 1990 election. But only after fees for tertiary education and 
  
14  The high inflation of 1987 is partly due to the introduction of GST and that added roughly 7 per cent to the 
overall price level. GST did not lead to an inflationary spiral, as the trade unions accepted the simultaneous 
introduction of lower personal income tax rates as compensation. Nevertheless, the net tax burden for all bar 
the top 10 per cent of earners rose, Robert Stephens "Social Services" in Silverstone, Bollard and Lattimore, 
above, 451. 
15  Figure 2 shows a budget surplus (Table 2 basis) from 1988. Revenue from asset sales was (incorrectly) 
placed as operating revenue rather than as a capital transaction. Using accrual accounting, a true budget 
surplus (operating) only occurred from 1993. 
16  New Zealand was probably hit most heavily by the November 1987 stock market crash. Banks, freed from 
direct control of their lending by the Reserve Bank, had overextended their lending to companies with 
substantial paper, but not real asset backing. Financial preservation of the banks required them to foreclose 
on several significant corporate entities, exacerbating the length of the recession.  
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pharmaceuticals had been introduced, local control of schools had been imposed, health services 
reformed and devolved and plans for a single social security benefit unveiled.  
F The Legacy of National Governments, 1990-99 
In 1990, National campaigned on the slogan of a "Decent Society", implying that they would 
reverse Labour's welfare charges and offset the increase in income inequality. However, the first 
policy initiative was an attack on the fundamental principles of the welfare state, with a shift in 
philosophy from "participation and belonging to the community" to a "modest safety net" based on 
individual and family responsibility for well-being rather than community responsibility undertaken 
through the apparatus of the State.17 
The general direction of economic management was maintained, with continuation of monetary 
policy to maintain the strict inflationary target, irrespective of the impact on other macroeconomic 
variables, privatisation and deregulation policies. The theories of efficiency of markets, contracting, 
managerialism and transaction costs were also applied to the welfare state with the introduction of 
quasi markets, or managed competition in health care, social service delivery and education.18 The 
separation of funding from service provision and delivery allowed private providers to compete with 
public hospitals, schools and other previously government controlled enterprises for contracts to 
provide pre-specified outputs. The aim was to increase productive efficiency, increase the 
responsiveness of service providers to client needs and give clients greater choice of service 
provider.  
The major social policy changes were that social security benefits were cut by an average of 12 
per cent in nominal terms; entitlement rules for benefits tightened; the health service reorganised 
with funder-provider splits coupled with targeted charges for services; a change in housing 
assistance from income-related state housing rentals to market rentals and a targeted housing 
supplement available for all forms of accommodation; increased tertiary student fees plus a switch 
from student grants to an income-contingent loan; a reduction in the universality of accident 
compensation and a change in the funding and organisation of the voluntary welfare sector. 
Grander, more integrated and targeted designs on the welfare state were planned with targeting of 
all social services, using Smart Card technology, so that "the top third of all income earners can be 
  
17  The stated justification for this gestalt switch in approach was a small financial crisis in the corporatised 
Bank of New Zealand that had overextended its lending prior to the 1987 Stock Market crash.  A more 
viable explanation is that the incoming government found that the government accounts were in far poorer 
condition than portrayed, as Labour's then Minister of Finance (David Caygill) had brought tax revenue 
forward through the shortening of tax payment periods. The changed philosophical approach accorded with 
the views of the incoming Minister of Finance (Ruth Richardson).  
18  Jonathan Boston (ed) The State Under Contract (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1995); Robert 
Stephens "Social Services" in Brian Silverstone, Alan Bollard and Ralph Lattimore (eds) A Study of 
Economic Reform: The Case of New Zealand (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1996) 451. 
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expected to meet most of the cost of their social services".19 These were abandoned as not 
politically and administratively feasible, resulting in a "welfare mess".20 
Despite supposedly achieving the correct incentive structures in the benefit and tax systems, 
numbers on income-tested benefits continued to grow, leading to a change in view as to reasons for 
accepting income-tested benefits. The problem was seen as a lack of individual motivation to seek 
work: the policy response was a mandatory welfare-to-work programme, where refusal of job 
interviews or employment offers could lead to sanctions on benefit receipt. Evaluations of this 
scheme have shown that there is no evidence of a long-term positive impact on training and 
employment outcomes, though many sponsors benefited through expansion of service delivery.21 
G Social and Economic Impacts 
Apart from a brief period in the mid-1990s, the economic and social outcomes are not really 
encouraging. Figure 1 shows that there were a couple of years where economic growth was 
significant, although that followed a couple of years of negative growth. If a Keynesian framework 
on macroeconomics is taken, then the recession of 1991-1993 is directly attributable to the 
significant reduction in aggregate demand brought about by the 1991 benefit cuts. This reduction in 
aggregate demand far outweighs any labour market incentive effects from the fall in the benefit 
replacement rate,22 resulting in an increase in unemployment and greater government expenditure. 
In the longer run, the new classical framework is more important, with the lower interest rates 
allowing a fall in the real exchange rate, improving international competitiveness, economic growth 
and lower unemployment were achieved, with a reduced balance of payment deficit and a budget 
surplus.  
It was in the area of social outcomes that most objections to the National Government's policies 
were voiced. Critics argued that the social reforms had led to widespread hardship, with low income 
households requiring food parcels to survive, or shifting to overcrowded accommodation or to rural 
areas to lower housing costs. The claim was that there were short-term consequences on health and 
standards of living, and long-term impacts on educational attainment, child development and future 
economic growth potential. Proponents argued that while there were short-term transition effects, 
  
19  Ruth Richardson "Statement by the Minister of Finance" in James (Jim) Bolger, Ruth Richardson and 
William (Bill) Birch Economic and Social Initiative (House of Representatives, Wellington, 1990). 
20  Susan St John and Anne Heynes "The Welfare Mess" in University of Auckland Department of Economics 
Policy Discussion Paper No 15 (Auckland, 1994). 
21  Department of Work and Income An Evaluation of the Expanded Community Taskforce Programme 
(Department of Work and Income, Wellington, 1999). 
22  In 1986, Roger Douglas had also lowered the benefit replacement rate in order to give an incentive to move 
into the labour force, but did so by increasing the returns from work via a guaranteed minimum family 
income and the provision of the family support tax credit to low income workers.  
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the improved economic performance, reduced dependency on the state, better work incentives, 
greater hospital efficiency and higher tertiary participation rates all indicate effective policy 
changes.23  
Figure 4 shows trends in income inequality and poverty between 1984 and 1998.24 Hills claimed 
that New Zealand had the largest increase in inequality in the OECD.25 Much of the widening in 
household disposable income occurred during the 1980s, and at the top end of the scale as a result of 
increases in higher salaries and lower top tax rates, with increased unemployment having a small 
effect at the bottom end. The benefit cuts were the dominant cause of the next increase in inequality 
to 1993, with the reductions in unemployment since then offsetting the impacts of greater earnings 
inequality.  
Using a focus group method for establishing a poverty line, Stephens and Waldegrave show that 
updating the 1993 poverty line estimate by the consumer price index (an absolute poverty measure) 
results in a substantial increase in the incidence of poverty until 1994, and an equally rapid decline 
since then.26 The largest increase in poverty is for families with dependent children, especially those 
brought up in sole parent situations. However, using a relative method of updating the 1993 poverty 
measure (based on 60 per cent of median household disposable equivalent income), the incidence of 
poverty fluctuates and actually fell in 1992. A decomposition of the results shows a substantial fall 
in poverty among the elderly – median income fell substantially at this stage while nominal pension 
levels were maintained. The reverse situation appeared in 1998 when the incidence of poverty, 
predominantly for the elderly, jumped after a small cut in the real level of the pension. The impact 
of higher housing costs for state and private tenants on poverty is demonstrated by the divergence 
between the before- and after-housing costs poverty measures.  
Other social indicators show mixed results. The Ministry of Social Development shows 
increased post-compulsory education retention rates despite the fee increases, better employment 
outcomes and improving trends in statistics such as cigarette smoking, life expectancy, road 
fatalities and workplace accidents.27 However, Te Puni Kokiri (The Ministry of Maori 
Development) highlights the large disparity in social and economic outcomes between Maori and 
  
23  See generally Robert Stephens "Social Services" in Brian Silverstone, Alan Bollard and Ralph Lattimore 
(eds) A Study of Economic Reform: The Case of New Zealand (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1996) 451. 
24  Data prior to 1984 is not available. Since 1998, the Household Economic Survey (the data source for these 
graphs) has been triennial. However the method of collating the 2001 data makes the results incompatible 
with prior years.   
25  John Hills Inquiry into Income and Wealth (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, New York, 1995). 
26  Robert Stephens, Charles Waldegrave and Paul Frater "Measuring Poverty in New Zealand" (1995) 5 Social 
Policy Journal of New Zealand 88; Robert Stephens and Charles Waldegrave "The Effectiveness of the 
Transfer and Tax System in Reducing Poverty in 1998" (2001) 16 Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 77. 
27  Ministry of Social Development The Social Report (Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, 2001). 
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non-Maori,28 and Asher reports on the significance of child poverty on worsening health outcomes 
for many children.29 Blaiklock and colleagues indicate the vulnerability of children during the 
period of reform, and the initial lack of monitoring on the adverse impact on children's outcomes, 
though they do acknowledge an increased provision of social services targeted to those in greatest 
need since the mid-1990s.30 
Equally, the efficiency gains from managed competition never materialised. Fiske and Ladd 
report that devolution and dezoning of schools resulted in substantial wasteful competition, white-
flight to "better schools", increased inequities between schools, no discernible improvement in 
educational achievement, but some greater diversity of school offerings.31 In health care, efficiency 
gains of roughly five per cent rather than the anticipated 20-30 per cent resulted in underfunding of 
hospitals, greater waiting lists, while the contracting out of outputs prevented flexibility of resource 
use. Incumbent monopoly positions from the presence of sunk costs meant that competition was 
largely restricted to elective surgery and long-term care.32 Some innovative social service delivery 
agency developed providing new and improved range of services to Maori and Pacific people, but 
most welfare agencies resented being accountable to the government for all of their output when 
only a fraction of their funding came from that source, and having service delivery tied to a 
contractual arrangement rather than responding flexibly on the basis of need.33  
H Social Development – Helen Clark and Labour Post-1999 
The election of the Labour/Alliance coalition Government in 1999 signalled an era when 
efficiency and equity concerns would be integrated. The initial policy responses of returning 
pension levels to 65 per cent of average earnings, returning to income-related rents for state housing, 
freezing tertiary fees and removing competition between health care and social service delivery 
providers and returning accident compensation to a state monopoly, showed both a commitment to 
social justice and a rejection of the competitive model for services provided by the State. Recent 
  
28  Te Puni Kokiri Progress Towards Closing Social and Economic Gaps between Maori and non-Maori: A 
Report to the Minister of Maori Affairs (Te Puni Kokiri, Wellington, 2000). 
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Poverty Action Group Backgrounder 20 (Child Poverty Action Group, Auckland, 2002). 
30  Alison Blaiklock "When the Invisible Hand Rocks the Cradle: New Zealand Children in a Time of Change" 
Innocenti Working Paper No 93 (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, Florence, 2002). 
31  Edward Fiske and Helen Ladd When Schools Compete: A Cautionary Tale (Brookings Institution Press, 
Washington DC, 2000). 
32  Toni Ashton "The Health Reforms: To Market and Back?" in Jonathan Boston, Paul Dalziel and Susan St 
John (eds) Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999) 134. 
33  John R Martin "Contracting and Accountability" in Jonathan Boston (ed) The State Under Contract (Bridget 
Williams Books, Wellington, 1995) 36-55. 
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work seems to have concentrated on developing holistic and inter-agency coordinated strategies to 
overcome the social problems, rather than specific policy developments.  
A combination of favourable climatic conditions, high commodity prices and a favourable real 
exchange rate led to rural economic growth, and did not threaten inflation targets. Thus New 
Zealand could go against the OECD economic recession, with improvements in the balance of 
payments and budget surplus.  
III CONCLUSIONS 
The two decades of economic and social reform have moved New Zealand from a heavily 
regulated and insular economy to one, by OECD standards, that is open and subject to market forces 
for the allocation of resources. Contrary to the predictions of liberal economic theory, the outcomes 
have been far from spectacular: modest economic growth, increasing income inequality and 
prevalence of poverty. Not all outcomes are pessimistic – unemployment, after initially increasing, 
is now at modest levels, the balance of payments deficit has improved and the government budget is 
in surplus.  
The economic fundamentals should allow for sustained growth. However, this potted history has 
shown the importance of getting the real exchange rate correct, and that should become the main 
target of monetary policy, rather than inflation. The other lesson from history is to ensure that 
adverse effects from policy change are offset by social policy instruments such as the need for 
retraining and skilling after the programmes of corporatisation and trade liberalisation.  
Whilst ACC started life at variance with traditional social policy and administrative 
arrangements, the subsequent changes to ACC have been more in line with the overall direction of 
policy reform than its origins. The shift in general social policy to user pays, cut backs in the 
universality of the scheme and the level of benefits, privatisation, the development of managed 
competition and the delivery of services under contractual arrangements to government funding 
organisations all have their counterparts in legislative and operative changes for the Accident 
Compensation scheme.  
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Figure 1 Trends in Economic Growth, Inflation and Unemployment 1960-
2002
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Source: Household Economic Survey 
Figure 2: Trends in Balance of Payments (Current Account) and Budget Deficit, 1960-
1998 (% GDP)
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Figure 3 Trends in Social and Total Government Expenditure, 1960-
2002 (%GDP)
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Figure 4 Trends in Inequality and Poverty 1984-1998
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